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Summary findings
Argentina implemented a major reform of its pension  Effective coverage is quite low. Affiliates represent
system in 1994. The new system has a mixed public-and-  fewer than 60% of eligible workers and only about 40%
private two-pillar structure. Its main elements are an  of the labor force. Fewer than 30% of eligible workers
unfunded, defined-benefit pillar operated by the state  and only about 20% of the labor force actively
and paying a basic pension to all workers who meet the  contribute.
minimum eligibility period, and a fully funded defined-  * Because the new system is young, the number of
contribution  individual capitalization pillar managed by  beneficiaries is small, mostly recipients of survivorship
specially authorized companies (AFJPs).  The second  and disability pensions.
pillar also has a public defined-benefit component, which  * Market concentration  is high, although lower than in
is operated  on an unfunded basis.  Chile. The top three companies account for 47% of
The new system replaced the old public pay-as-you-go  affiliates and assets; the top six account for 78%.
pension system, which was facing immense financial  * In March 1997, asset allocation was 51%
pressures.  government bonds, 23% corporate equities and mutual
Vittas assesses  the performance of the funded  fund shares, 17% bank deposits, and 7% corporate
component of the second pillar. He finds that:  bonds. Equity holdings' share has been rising, mainly at
- The private pillar had attracted  (by June 1996)  the expense of bank deposits.
67% of all workers participating in the new integrated  * Real rates of return average over 15% a year,
system. It also represents 60% of those who are active  although high commission charges substantially reduce
contributors. It has attracted  many younger workers and  the net real returns to individual workers. But costs are
has begun to mobilize a large, fast-growing pool of long-  coming down sharply as a percentage of average assets.
term financial resources.  Net real returns for a worker's full career are expected to
* The AFJPs have earned very high real investment  be highly positive so long as gross investment returns
returns, offset by very high operating costs. Individual  remain strong.
affiliates have so far earned negative real returns because  The AFJP system faces three main challenges: how to
of high commission charges..  But in the long run, net  contain  operating and marketing costs; how to increase
returns are likely to be positive as assets accumulate and  effective coverage; and how to relax the draconian
operating costs are better controlled.  regulations while maintaining a stable, transparent,  and
safe system.
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comments.￿  F.I.  INTRODUCTION  AND SUMMARY  OF FINDINGS
INTRODUCTION
Argentina implemented  a major reform of its pension system in 1994.  The new system has a
mixed public/private two-pillar structure.  Its main elements  are an unfunded defined benefit pillar
operated by the state and paying a basic pension  to all workers  who meet  the minimum  eligibility  period;
and a fully funded defined contribution  individual  capitalization  pillar managed  by specially  authorized
companies, known as Administradoras  de Fondos de Jubilaciones  y Pensiones  or AFJPs.  The second
pillar also has a public defined  benefit component  that is operated  on an unfunded  basis (see Box 1).
The new system  became  operational  in July 1994  when it replaced  the old public "pay-as-you-go"
pension system  that was facing immense  financial  pressures. With some  notable  exceptions,  participation
is compulsory  on all workers, including  the self-employed.  Workers  have the right to choose the defined
benefit plan of the public component  of the second  pillar instead  of the individual  capitalization  accounts
of the funded  component,  while  those who  join the latter have  the right to select and change  their pension
fund management  company.
The new Argentine  pension system is governed  by two basic laws: Law 24241, which  created  the
new integrated  pension system and was enacted  in October  1993; and Law 24463 on pension solidarity,
which sought to limit the future cost of the public components  of the new system and was enacted in
March 1995 at the time of the Mexican crisis (see Box 2).  Allowing for the ongoing integration of
provincial pension  schemes  into the national  system, one could  argue that Argentina  has implemented  3
major reforms of its pension system since 1993.
This paper provides an assessment  of the performance  of the funded component  of the second
pillar.  The main topics covered  include the structure  and coverage  of the private pillar, the mobilization
of long-term savings, the investment  policies, investment  performance  and operating efficiency  of the
pension funds, the provision and cost of disability and term life insurance, and the effectiveness  of
regulation and supervision.  The paper draws on the statistical bulletins and several excellent papers
published  by the Economic  Studies Unit of SAFJP.  '  A companion  paper (Vittas 1997a) examines  the
relevance  of the Argentine  pension reform for Eastern European  countries and focuses  on the problems
of the old pension system, the finances  and functioning  of the public pillar, especially  the evolution of
evasion  and the continuing  burden of past pension  promises,  and the similarities  and differences  with Chile
and Switzerland.
Recent  papers that discuss  the Argentine  pension  reform include  Schulthess  and Demarco  (1996),
Cottani and Demarco (1996), Rofman  (1996), Rofman  and Bertin (1996), Rofman  and Stirparo (1996),
Bertin and Perrotto (1996), and Grushka and De Biase (1996).
ISUMMARY  OF FINDINGS
The AFJP system has many features in common  with the Chilean system.  Only specialized
companies  are authorized  to manage  pension  accounts,  workers  can  only have  one account,  each company
can only operate one pension fund, is required to charge the same prices and commissions  to all its
affiliates (except for the offer of loyalty discounts),  and is required to arrange one group term life and
disability  insurance  policy for all its affiliates.  The system is heavily  regulated  and supervised  to ensure
both its soundness and fair treatment of affiliates.  Disability and term life insurance as well as the
decumulation  phase (life annuities  or scheduled  withdrawals)  are also organized  along similar lines.
The record of the  private pillar has been characterized  by a vigorous response and a robust
performance  in a highly  uncertain  environment. Despite  a slow start, the private pillar has succeeded  in
attracting by June 1996 67% of all workers who participate in the new integrated system.  It also
represents 60% of those who are active contributors (Schulthess  and Demarco 1996). It has attracted
many younger workers and has started to mobilize  a large and fast growing pool of long-term financial
resources. The assets of the pension funds  reached  3.8 billion pesos or 1.4% of GDP in June 1996, and
are expected  to exceed  20 billion pesos (or 4% of projected  GDP) by the year 2000.
The AFJPs have eamed very high real investment  returns, although  they have also suffered from
very high operating  costs.  Despite the high investment  retums, individual  affiliates  have so far earned
negative real returns because of the high commission  charges. However, net returns are likely to be
positive in the long run as assets accumulate  and operating costs come under better control.  The
Argentine  private pension  pillar shares many of the strengths  and weaknesses  that have  characterized  the
Chilean pension reform (Shah 1996, Vittas 1997b).
The following  paragraphs  summarize  in bullet form some  of the main features, achievements  and
shortcomings  of the new system.
*  Coverage. 5.6 million  workers  were affiliated  to the AFJP system  in March 1997, but only 2.8
million were active contributors. Affiliates  represented  less than 60% of eligible workers and
only about  40% of the labor force. Active contributors  were less than 30% of eligible workers
and only about 20% of the labor force.  Effective  coverage  is thus quite low.
*  Benefits. As in Chile, benefits  from the AFJP system  take  the form of life annuities  or scheduled
withdrawals. There are also disability  and survivorship  pensions. Because  of the very young age
of the new system, the number  of beneficiaries  is very small and consists mostly  of survivorship
and disability  pensions.
*  Market Structure. 25 companies  started operations in July 1994, but following  a number of
mergers, their number  has declined  to 20.  Most companies  are  joint ventures  between  domestic
and foreign banks and insurance  companies,  though some have also been set up by trade unions
or various groups of local institutions. The latter are in general small and account for a very
small part of the market.  One AFJP is operated  by the state-owned  Banco de la Nacion.  Its
market share has been declining  and it now only has 8% of affiliates  and 6% of funds under
management.
*  Market  Concentration. Market concentration  is quite high, though lower than in Chile.  The
top 3 companies  account for 47% of affiliates  and assets under management  and the top 6 for
2Box 1:. The:  NewiStructue
With s,c,.e.n-i,able-e-c,e'tions (e.g  mi'tr,  c'ne  y'.:ioeso  peio  u4an-
::police  ai  provica  workers}  partcipaton in  the  n:-:-  istrtrs),  isz  a defind contriuio  sytm  a ,  . . :-.,s,--::..................  . . ..  . . . . . i ':.:'::  .::
new  syt.Ow s  ml  o  fra.  w  s  n nt  a
ch.:::poifcewetherto  w joi  h  v  Or, p  ic  -.  te  u  d  c  e  w  is  kownas
-The Firs  Pilr  Th:is  ir  whc  is  ::l scheme.::  :
: ubli . i.s re  sposible  f- r  three  rin  tyes  of  -
bnfits:  one  pemnt  and tw  tasor:  The  :l  age penso  foI  th  A.  sytm:si
.(i)  a  baic  nvra  :penion  petco  @g  besica  . ihrwl  a:  nteacmltdblnei
universa:  or  PBU),  e%  eg  h a  u  P so
-:vered  waesbut subjec:ttoamimu  eligbiit  ::  ab.t  an  -- viorhi  benft.wihaeB
:periodo 30  years ad::a nrma  'retreen  a  of  a:-:  definedbeneft ntre  ad  ae: coee  b  ru
-65  for meni  an  60fr  wom-en(the  amun  of  - th  disblt  an  temlfnu  c.  Th  isilt
-I  Bis  ~rae  yt%  orevyadditona  y.a  an  suvirsi  beeft  of wok  ho swit--h
::of conrbuion,  up to a tota of 45 years:  to:::::  th  A.J  syse  arepro-ratedwt  thepb
- (i)- -ia  --compenstor  pni  n  : :-  aio  contr-  - ibutio  to eac  pia.  ::  ::  ::
compensatoria  or PC) for  astcontribution  to e  :  -
o:  :  -systet  and  paying  a pesion  qWtq  t  i.5F%'  of :.  Th  e  PA  omonen -ay  -0.85  favrg
-:  ave:ag  iar  of te  l st 10yeas  omm  ent  sa  f  h  t
for--  b.e'veryo year=  of.,.c,ontribution,  to'  '.:"h:e: old s'yst.em  evr  yea  of sevc  '  the new sysem  't  als
h*  ''  i  t'e  ,  ...  ..  . i
(:paT  . rv.ce  with..  . F  :.i  Ofl  3i$ ye44tAod  and  sr  -ivo  -rsp  -enefits:  ::-a
P--a  .- na  o te  o  d by t
(liii  the  ensions  pai  dtoweisd  tpensitones  Thedseco  pillr sI  :n-finuanedA  byan11
T  i(OmMilon  basicotribtio  rat  abesdo  mloes  o  h
avnaaor PEA) whichis paid  topeoploer 70  -: -w:it  iregrd"'  to  tenlife an  diailt  insuranc'e.-'-.:'.
10yerso cotiuin  .5TePAi  qa  cptlacuuainad35  o  nuac
70%  uvs  of the PRU:  or abot2 19% of the -- averg  pr  emiums and ad.iniyrie  ss.:  h  PA
co-  eed - wage.  Winally,  the,state  also  pays  component  -i  op  n 
n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..  -y  i  ::  s.  s.rY.  0  ,41a  ,  ,  ,'00  0 0
--:with  <.the.  :$  ate.....  :-i:-:r.-'  pesons'  'iF.uture-P.AP  ension  W.il  be coee
bf  :  :ute  c  niu  e  es  a 
The  p.lic  pillar  is  financed  by..a..16%  . trn.s  i  . Contributions arecollected.  y  - .the  t
i::opntrbto  assssd  oo: ig  ie  6ii6pxr~sand  byatoiyad  r  hndsrbue  oteA .i:~~~~~nkAo  . A  -a; o
eamr.  tae  .and tran..  .. s :.fers:  fro  genea  and  ANSeS  (the  public  agenc.. :  y tha amiistr  the: .b
reeus,  hsrt  was loed  to an . ge of  firt  pila  anth  PA).yii-i 
:-  .uing  199.  6  :  od  . pr  t  re.  o  a
co.ntributkn  rat forthe  frt  pillar  wil dlie.  PAP copnet  of the secn  pilr  The  also
---e  P  d.  may  e  be  :  e  y  gen  h  t  :rht  o  nfe  i  o  t
r&t  s  t  corin  a  n  A  o  i  a  a  W  w 
sitc  ts  tfeS  c  . Wrka  er. w
--  m Xtnve,P..  D:  a:m:  _The Sco= dTlr  hshsbt  a  fudd  p  o  i  1  ystem  canno reur  o h  P? mosty  pivae~  ompnen  an  an  nfuded,  athogh  spcia  provision  offre  aferth
public  component.  enacttnent  o~~~~~~~~~~~~~pli..,~]ff:.  the onew  law  ,allowed  sufwokr
"'~  ~ ~ ~~  ~~~e t  j"r  ''  '"'''""'  .""  '"  .'.  ""b  , .''''.'.'.''  '  be  ..  ....... '  '  '.',  '.  .j  .
<--i<p<iEens--tfi.  switch  bDA  b  toi
i)j the fundedcomponent,  hich  ,.  .. i  mana.  .ed  by.  .....
AId st  d''  -nstadra  de  IoNo de  I  rubTla-around 78%.  The Herfindahl  index  stands at 1121  for the distribution  of affiliates  and 1158  for
the distribution of funds.  Concentration  has been rising, mainly because of the mergers.  The
largest companies already have nearly 1 million affiliates and 1 billion pesos in assets under
management.
*  Savings  Mobilization. Total contributions  to the AFJP system  from August 1994  to March 1997
amounted  to 7.2 billion pesos. Commission  charges  and insurance  premiums  absorbed  2.3 billion
pesos (about  32% of contributions),  leaving  4.9 billion pesos  for long-term  capital  accumulation.
Adding investment  income earned, the total funds under management  by AFJPs stood at 6.2
billion pesos in March 1997  or 2.2% of GDP.
*  Asset Allocation.  In March 1997, asset allocation was 51% government  bonds, 17% bank
deposits, 7 % corporate  bonds and 23  % corporate  equities  and mutual  fund shares. The share  of
equity holdings has been rising, mainly at the expense  of bank deposits.
*  The allocation  of investments  by currency  was 43% in peso-denominated  instruments  and 57%
in dollar-denominated  instruments  in June 1995.  This changed to 50/50 by June 1996. The
distribution  of debt instruments  by maturity  was 21 % in less than 2 years; 40% between 2 and
4 years; and 39% over 4 years.
*  Foreign Investments. Though permitted up to a 10% overall limit, investments in foreign
securities were minuscule, probably reflecting  the technical difficulties  of investing overseas
(rating requirements,  custodial arrangements),  the low level  of available  funds, and the high real
returns obtainable  in the local market.
*  Investment  Returns. Real rates of return averaged  over 15% p.a., but very high commission
charges reduced substantially  the net real returns to individual  workers.  However, costs are
coming down sharply as a percentage  of average assets.  Net real returns for a worker's full
career are expected  to be highly  positive  as long as gross investment  returns continue  to be strong.
*  Account  Switching. Following  the Chilean  prototype,  there is already  a large  volume  of account
switching. One in five of active accounts  are transferred  annually.  This is lower than in Chile,
where nearly  one in two active  accounts  are now  transferred  annually, but it is causing  concern.
*  Operating  Costs. Excluding  the amortization  of deferred  costs, operating  costs  amounted  to 74%
of average  assets under management  in fiscal 1995  but fell to 23  % in fiscal 1996,  mainly  because
of the rapid growth of assets.  They fell further to  10% of average assets during the first 8
months of fiscal 1997. In the long run, costs will probably  decline  to less than 2 % of assets. In
relation  to contributions,  operating  costs fell from 27% in fiscal 1995  to 22% in fiscal 1996 and
21 % in fiscal 1997  (first 8 months).
*  The 25 AFJPs spent 600 million  pesos before starting operations, another 500 million pesos in
the first year, an additional  600 million  pesos in this second year and a further 500 million  pesos
in the first 8 months of fiscal 1997 (equivalent  to over 700 million for a full year).  The total
amount of 2.2 billion pesos corresponds  to 0.8% of GDP.
*  Financial results.  AFJPs were unable to recover  all their operating  costs in fiscal 1995,  during
which they suffered a heavy operating loss.  Financial results improved substantially  in fiscal
41996, as the cost of term life and disability  insurance  turned out to be much  lower than originally
expected  and companies  were able to re-allocate  commission  charges  to a recovery of their high
operating costs.
*  Financial results are promising  to be much improved in fiscal 1997.  11 AFJPs have already
exceeded their break-even point and another 5 suffer a small operating deficit, with only 4
companies  continuing  to suffer  large operating  losses. However,  the companies  have still a long
way to go to recoup  their very high start-up costs.
*  ReRgulation  and Supervision. Apart from the problem  caused  by account  transfers, there seems
to be little concem  right now  about  any adverse  impact  of regulation. As investment  policies  have
been highly conservative, the various limits, and especially those on equities and foreign
securities, have not been binding.
*  In fiscal 1995, there was some concern that supervision had been mostly preoccupied with
controlling  the credentials  and behavior  of agents. However, growing  emphasis  has been placed
on financial and prudential  controls to ensure the safety of funds under management  and thus
protect the interests  of affiliates. Some companies  emphasize  the importance  of a consistent  and
equitable  application  of the regulations  and sanctions  as otherwise  abiding  companies  may suffer
by comparison  to those which disregard  the rules.
Pcolicy  Issues and Challenges. The biggest  and thorniest  policy issues  are the excessive  level of
costs, the marketing  intensity  of the system, and the high level of account  switching. A detailed
study of the reasons behind these features, of their implications  for the future evolution of the
system, and of possible  solutions  needs to be undertaken  in cooperation  with market  practitioners.
*  The main question to be addressed should be whether the apparently "excessive" costs are
motivated  by distorted incentives  arising  from the "draconian"  regulatory  regime  or whether  they
are due to the massive  effort involved  in reaching, in a relatively  short time, millions of workers
with low balances and with no prior holding not only of mutual  fund accounts  but also in many
cases of bank accounts.
*-^  kAnother  challenge  is to increase  effective  coverage  of the AFJP system  and combat evasion.  The
Association  of AFJPs could be encouraged  to mount  a collective  publicity  campaign  to extol the
benefits  of the AFJP system and its complementarity  with the public pillar, while tax incentives
and more effective  policing  of compliance  would also have to play a crucial role.
5................  ....................... ............  ........  . .....  .......  ................ ..........  .......  ... ..  . . . ..... . . ...............  ............  ...... ..........  ...........  .......... ....  . ....... ...........  ... . ￿:.. .......  ....... ............  ................ . ...............  ........... ...........................  ...............  ...  .....  94  ................ ......................  . ....aa ................  ............ .... ...........  X.:  ............ ...........  .... q................. ..........  .............................. ...........  ............  ............ ............. ........ ..........  ........-........ .....  . ...  .. .:S.0 U..  P.  OM."  MY IA* ...............  ..........  ........  ............  . ...  .. ..................  ........ . ............  ......................  .............. ....  ...  ................ 
. ............
.................  ...........  ............. .-:....  .......  ............ ..................  .........................  .....  ....  .....  ...  ............  .. ................  .............  ..  ....  ...... ................  ......................  .......  .... ................. %...............  ..................  ................  ...  ... ....... ........................  ................................  .......  . ....  ....  ..........  ............. aa M UdWt  1.  ah ................. Y.  Va&..  M.......  ........... tAw.  .......  ..................... ........................ .................  ........... ..............  ...  .............  ...............................  . . ...  .....  ......... ............  ......  ....  ..  . .......  . ........... ....  ...........  .....................  ................... ...............  ......-........  ..........  ............  ..................  -- ...  ........  ............. ....  .......  .......  ..  ...  ............  ....... .................... .......  ..  . ............... .......  ................. ...  ........................ ............. .................  ...............................  .......  . ...... ...  .............. ........ ..  ...  ffitnitted-  d::': -......... ............... g..  ..  ..  ...  . .....  .....  ..................... .. ....................-.......  ...... W-11  ......  .....  ............. .................  .............  ..  ............  ............... .....  ....  . ....  q P.  BU--,.  ::X  M:p: OM  .. So  X ..........  . ........ 4w  .......  X,  ...... .......  ............................... a ..........  .........  ........  -.-  ..  ....  ......  ............  ....  ....  .0 ...... .............  .......................  ............ ffi-  ........  ....  .. ......  ................  .......  ..  ....  ....  . ok......I.:  .......................... ......  .us  em..%.....--.....--,--.,,..  ..... Am.  De=  e,:Avax  . ................---g .......  er .......  ................  .......  ...... ....................  ..................  ..............  ...  ......  ......  ............ ............... ....  ............... ............. ....  ...... .....................-...  ......  ...  ..  . ......  ................... .................  .........  ..........  . .... ................. ..........  ..  . ...........  ...  . ........  ....  .........  ...........  ........................ .................  ..................
Ah  A6.- .........  . .... .........  .................-.............  ... ................  .....-......................  . ......................... ...........  ........  . ..  ..................... .........................-...............  .............  ..........  ..................  ........... M  . XA.  2:  5:  ...... ...  . ...  ...........  .................  .......  ..  ..  .......................  ......  ................. ..........  ................-..................  ..............  .......  -- ................ .................  ..........  -.1-  .......  ...  ...........  ............. .....  ......  .......-  ....  .........  ..............  .....  ...  -.-  .....................  . .......... I...... .................... ................ ............ .......................................................... V  em.  .........  ..  ..  ... ...........  ....... ......  ........- Jt:j*  . A  ."'.6sw  ............. .................  .........................  ..............  ...................... M....  ......  ....  ......... m  a M -4.........  .. s"An',  19 ....  .df ..........  ............  ... .................  ........  ...... .... .......  &.1  ..... . .....  ........- _'.  W]:  ... -- ............ .........  .. ....  ...I￿:  ....................  .........  ............. 4  M .c  I I . ....  ..............  .0  .............. . . ....  ...... ............  .....  ally  ..  ........... ....  the' ...................  ............  .............. ............................  .......  .......................  .......................  .......... ..................  ...........................  ..................  ............... ................................ ........  ..  . ...........  .....  ...... Ar:.::. .....................  ........ .....................  ......... ...................  ...........  ..............  ...................  ......
.1 .W  .Subl,  d=  f-I  ..  . ..  ......... -W wedi"  ..........  ........ .......  .....  PON  .......  ..... ................. .....................  ...... X.' ............  ... J  . -￿--￿.-Adl  SO'dii"t,bew  w  a  V ..  r......  ' ..  ....  ...  .....  ..  ........... ...............  .......  .........................  .....  .....  .. ...... ..................................  ......... ............  .....  . ....................  .....  ..  ........ ......  .........  th ...  . .......  ...............  ..............  ...... ................  ..  .....  ..........  ... ........ .......................................  .....................  ...........  ..  . . .....  .....  .....  ......  ......  %..%  ......... ............  ...  ......  ..  . . .......  ........  ......  .............  ....  ..  .............  ....  ......  ....  .. .......................  ........ .............  'Y -ordV-1  "Orm.:
..............  ..........................  ................... ....  ......  ............. ... .....  .......  ......  .......................  --- ........ ....  .......  . ......  ...................  -.......  ...........  . ....  A  X ............... ...........
0.8  ............
...  ..........  ........... Am& 7-he ...........  .........  ................  .......  ...  . .......  I... ............  ....  ......  ........  ....................  .. ..........  .......  ...  ..  ..  ...............  .......  ....... .......  .........  .................... ............  ..........  - ---------  .............II.  THE STRUCTURE  AND PERFORMANCE  OF TIHE  AFJP SYSTEM
I'he private component of the new system follows the pattern of the Chilean reform, although
there are some important  differences.  At one level, the investment  rules are more liberal than those
initially  applied in Chile. But at another  level, the provisions  regarding  the role of the state-owned  Banco
de la Nacion imply a bigger role for the state than the Chilean  system. Combined  with the offer of the
universal basic  pension (PBU) and the option  to join the unfunded  component  of the second pillar (PAP)
(for both existing workers and new entrants to the labor force), it is clear that the Argentine reform
program represents  a much more limited  privatization  of pensions  than is the case in Chile.
Coverage:  Affiliates  and Active Contributors
Except for the military, the police, and workers covered by provincial pension systems,
participation  in the national  integrated  system  is compulsory  for both dependent  and independent  workers.
This is dilfferent  from Chile where only dependent  workers have to join the system.
Before  the launching  of the new system, estimates  of the proportion of workers who would opt
for the AFJP system  varied from 50 % to as high as 70 %. An important  provision of the new law stated
that if workers failed to express a preference  for the PAP scheme,  they would be presumed  to join the
AFJP system.  This was used as a justification for the government  expectation  that 70% or more of
workers would  join the AFJP system, since  inaction  and inertia would  favor the private component  of the
second pillar. 2
But despite  this presumption  and despite  the massive  campaigns  of AFJPs between  April and June
1994, the pace of affiliation  was initially quite slow. Only 1.8 million  workers were affiliated  when the
system became operational  at the beginning of July 1994.  This represented around 20% of eligible
workers (i.e. the total employed  labor force less those workers covered  by special schemes). The pace
of affiliation accelerated  after July.  The number of affiliates  reached  2.2 million  in August 1994, 4.0
million in June 1995 1994, 5.4 million  in June 1996 (Table 1). It rose further to 5.6 million  by March
1997. Affiliation  was encouraged  by the amnesty  that was announced  for the second  half of calendar  1995
and by the incorporation  of some provincial  pension schemes  in the national  system during 1996.
VWorkers  affiliated  to the funded  pillar represent  about  50  % of all eligible  workers  and over 67  %
of all affiliated  workers (i.e. including  those who have opted  for the PAP).  Total affiliation  to the new
system reached 8 million workers in June 1996 or about 75% of all eligible workers.  The share
represented  by the capitalization  system rose from 39% in August 1994  to 57% in June 1995 and 67%
in June 1996 (Table 2).  However, as in Chile, there is a big discrepancy  between affiliates  and active
contributors. Only about  50% of AFJP affiliates  are active  contributors  and they represent  less than 30%
of eligible employed  workers. The ratio rose in December 1995  because  of the offer of fiscal amnesty,
but resumned  its decline  by June 1996.  Although  the ratio of active contributors  is higher for the PAP
2  Eventually,  the allocation  of undecided  workers  was  based on market shares  in terms of affiliates.
7Table 1
AFFILIATION  AND ACTIVE  CONTRIBUTORS  TO AFJP AND PAP SYSTEMS
Affiliates  Active Contributors
(OOOs)  (OOOs)
AFJP  PAP  Total*  AFJP  PAP  Total*
August  94  2242  2674  5708  1412  2150  4377
December  94  3502  2913  6602  2120  2173  4542
June 95  4021  2824  7093  2016  1916  4180
December  95  4881  2690  7738  2842  2002  5010
June 96  5363  2590  7987  2728  1642  4589
*  Totals include  undecided  and some other minor groups of workers.
Source:  Schulthess  and Demarco  (1996)
Table 2
AFFILIATION  AND ACTIVE  CONTRIBUTORS  TO AFJP AND PAP SYSTEMS
Affiliates  Active Contributors  Actdve  Cat1bu01
% of total*  % of total*  % of own  aflial
AFJP  PAP  AFJP  PAP  AFJP  PAP
August 94  39.3  46.9  32.2  49.1  63.0  80.4
December  94  53.0  44.1  46.7  47.8  60.5  74.6
June 95  56.7  39.8  48.2  45.8  50.1  67.8
December  95  63.1  34.8  56.7  40.0  58.2  74.4
June 96  67.1  32.4  59.4  35.8  50.9  63.4
*  Totals include  undecided  and some other minor groups of  workers.
Source:  Schulthess  and Demarco  (1996)
8component,  perhaps because of the older age of PAP affiliates, it has also followed  a declining  trend,
falling from 80% in August 1994 to 63% in June 1996.3
It is not totally clear why there is such a wide discrepancy  between  the number  of affiliates  and
active contributors. The movement  of some workers in and out of the labor market (e.g. housewives,
students,  seasonal  workers, etc)  may explain  part of the  discrepancy,  while  the rise in unemployment  must
also be a factor.  But in addition  many workers may have felt the need to register (since verification  of
affiliation is probably easier) but not the need to maintain their contributions (where verification of
compliance is probably more difficult).  Another factor may have been mistakes in registration and
duplicate  affiliation  or even  multiple accounts  (despite  the fact that the rules impose  a "one account per
worker" limitation).
Thie extent of the discrepancy  between affiliates and active contributors is a cause for some
concern.  This is because less than full contribution  periods imply a higher likelihood of inadequate
accumulation  of capital and thus probably low pensions.  However, to the extent that workers with
interrupted  careers and/or incomplete  contribution  records are not household  heads but second income
earners, thle  low pension in retirement  may present less of a social problem. 4
An encouraging  feature of the pattern of affiliation  is the young age of affiliated  workers. 54%
of workers who opted to join the AFJP system are less than 35 years old, 37% are between 35 and 49,
and 9% are 50 or more 5. In contrast, informal  data for June 1995 show that only 36% of contributors
to the PAP component  are less than 35, while 27% are over 50.  As expected, the age structure of the
public defined benefit component of the second pillar is much older.  Nevertheless,  45% of young
workers (less than 35) were affiliated  in the PAP component  against 75% of older workers (over 50),
showing  that AFJPs still have a long way to go to attract the vast majority of younger workers.  The
transfer of many  workers  to the AFJP system  over the past two years suggests  that more young workers
have now joined the AFJP system. The data confirm the expectation  that younger workers were more
likely to join the private pillar.  At the same time, they raise some serious questions about the future
fmances oiF  the PAP component  of the system since its dependency  ratio is likely to deteriorate sharply
over the next twenty years.
3  The numbers shown in Table 2 vary slightly from those quoted in Rofman and Bertin (1996).
The difference  is puzzling since  the data come from the same source and the same agency  but then it is
in the nature of pension and social security  data quoted  in two different  publications  that they are almost
never identical!
4  A growing discrepancy  between  affiliates  and active contributors  should be expected  in mature
systems. Such  a discrepancy  is found even  in the national  provident  funds  of Singapore  and Malaysia  and
should also characterize  the social  security  systems  of most countries,  including  that of the United States.
There is a r  eal social problem  only to the extent  that heads  of households  have short contribution  periods.
This is an issue that could benefit from more in-depth  research.
5  These percentages are based on those who declared  their age (no age is provided by 17% of
affiliates). In Chile, the 1993  age structure  of affiliates  was 63%, 29% and 8% for the same age groups.
9Savings Mobilization
Active  participants  must make  contributions  equal to 11  % of their monthly  salary, up to a ceiling
of 60 AMPOs. (The limit corresponds  by now to 5,000 pesos per month, which is quite high in terms
of the earnings  distribution  of Argentine  workers.) Additional  voluntary contributions  are also allowed.
Out of the compulsory  contribution,  AFJPs deduct  the premium  for term life and disability  insurance  and
their commission  fees to cover their operating expenses  and profits.  The average deduction by AFJPs
amounts  to 3.5%, leaving 7.5 % for long-term  capital accumulation.
AFJPs collectively  mobilized 1.88 billion pesos during the first year of operation of the new
system. The first year covered 11  months  of contributions  since  the first collections  were made in August
1994. Thus, on a 12-month  basis, total contributions  would  have exceeded  2 billion pesos, corresponding
to 0.7% of GDP.  At an 11  % contribution  rate, the total collections  implied  that the contribution  base,
i.e. the wages covered  by those affiliated  and contributing  to the AFJP system, amounted  to 18.6 billion
pesos or only 6.6% of GDP.
Available  estimates  of the personal contributions  made to the PAP in fiscal 1995  show that they
amounted  to 2.78 billion  pesos, corresponding  to a contribution  base of 25.3 billion  pesos. Thus, the total
covered wage bill amounted  to 43.9 billion pesos or only 15.7% of GDP.  This is a low percentage  by
international  standards.  It may be explained  by widespread  evasion and perhaps also by a low labor
income  share in GDP.
Contributions  to the AFJP system increased  by 46% and reached  2.74 billion pesos in the second
year.  They represented 1  % of GDP, while the covered  wage bill amounted  to 9% of GDP.  Assuming
that the wage bill covered  by the PAP did not exceed 10% in fiscal 1996, the total covered  wage bill was
still less than 20% of GDP.  An improvement  over the first year but still very low in relation to its
potential level.
In the first 9 months of fiscal 1997,  contributions  amounted  to 2.55 billion pesos, equivalent  to
an annual flow of 3.5 billion pesos.  The covered wage bill increased  to 31.8 billion pesos or 11% of
GDP.  It is gradually increasing  but is still low by the standards of more developed  countries.
Collections  from contributions  fluctuated  considerably  from month to month (Table 3).  These
reflected  the payment of the half-year  bonus in January and July of each year, bunched  payments  caused
by the fiscal amnesty offered employers who were late with their payments, and fluctuations in the
number  of active contributors.
Out of the total collections  of 4.62 billion pesos of the first two years of operations, around 1.5
billion were used to cover insurance  premiums  and operating costs. This left over 3.1 billion pesos for
long-term  capital  accumulation. At the end of June 1996,  the total funds mobilized  by the pension funds,
including investment  income earned, amounted  to 3.84 billion pesos, corresponding  to 1.4% of GDP
(Table 4).
In the first 9 months  of fiscal 1997, 1.75  billion pesos were accumulated  for long-term  purposes.
Total funds  under management  reached  6.24 billion in March 1997.
10Table 3
TOTAL  CONTRIBUTION  REVENUES  OF AFJPs
(million  pesos)
First Year (July 1994-June  1995)
July 1994  n.a.  January 1995  234.8
August 1994  154.4  February 1995  171.6
September  1994  169.1  March 1995  163.9
October 1994  172.1  April 1995  162.4
November  1994  154.1  May 1995  167.3
December 1994  157.4  June 1995  177.3
Second  Year (July 1995-June  1996)
July 1995  260.0  January 1996  301.3
August 1995  221.8  February 1996  222.7
September  1995  189.0  March 1996  286.5
October 1995  186.3  April 1996  211.9
November  1995  191.0  May 1996  221.8
December 1995  232.2  June 1996  220.3
Third Year (July 1996-March  1997)
July 1996  346.9  January 1997  384.2
August 1996  239.4  February 1997  284.8
September  1996  248.5  March 1997  268.1
October 1996  266.9
November 1996  256.2




Level  Level  Change
bn pesos  % GDP  % GDP
December 1994  0.52  0.18
March 1995  0.95  0.35  0.17
June 1995  1.36  0.47  0.12
September 1995  1.89  0.70  0.23
December 1995  2.50  0.91  0.21
March 1996  3.22  1.22  0.31
June 1996  3.84  1.40  0.18
September 1996  4.49  1.63  0.23
December 1996  5.33  1.91  0.28
March 1997  6.24  2.20  0.29
Source: SAFJP
11Tax Treatment
According  to the pension law, the tax treatment  of the new system was to confer the benefit of
tax deferral  to its participants  by making  contributions  deductible  from income  tax, exempting  investment
income from taxation, and subjecting pensions to tax as any other source of income.  Although a
compulsory  pension  system  does  not need  in principle  to offer any inducements  to encourage  participation,
in practice offering tax incentives may facilitate compliance  and may thus achieve a higher level of
coverage.  Tax incentives  may also be important  if other means of ensuring compliance,  such as more
effective  policing, are not adequately  developed.
One effective,  less costly and perhaps also more equitable  system of tax incentives  could be the
offer by the government  of credit transfers to contributors  to the system, especially  to affiliates of the
AFJP system. This could involve crediting  to the individual  capitalization  accounts  a small  contribution
from the government  that would be conditional  on the receipt  of a monthly  contribution  equal  to 11  % of
monthly income. 6 This system  would  benefit  low income  workers, including  nontaxpayers,  and could  be
designed in a way that could be much less costly than allowing  tax deductibility  of contributions  at the
marginal  tax rate of each worker. It could  be a means  of subsidizing  low income  workers and offsetting
the relatively  higher cost of operating  low income  accounts. However, offering  tax incentives  is costly
to the budget  which is already under strong  financial  pressure. Any incentives  must be considered  in the
context of broader tax policy.
Given the centralization  of the collection of contributions in the tax collection agency, the
authorities  need  to consider  various  steps, including  in particular  cross checking  of tax returns, to promote
greater compliance  and reduce evasion. These measures  would also be very important  for ensuring the
financial  viability of the public pillar as evasion  of contributions  is a major drawback  on the latter.
Another means  to promote compliance,  especially  among  low income workers, would be to use
the concept of "coordinated  earnings"  that is applied in Switzerland. This could  exempt earnings  below,
say, 40% of the average wage from contributing  to the second  pillar (Vittas 1997a, Queisser  and Vittas
1997). Such an approach  would  probably  require raising  the contribution  rate on the earnings  that would
be subject to the contributions to the second pillar.  Like the co-contribution  mentioned above, its
introduction  would need to be examined  as part of broader tax and pension policy.
Benefits
The private pillar provides three related types of benefits: ordinary retirement, disability and
survivorship  pensions. Like its Chilean counterpart,  the AFJP system combines  a defined-contribution
scheme for ordinary retirement pensions with defined-benefit  schemes  for disability and survivorship
pensions.  The life annuities  bought at the time of retirement, or at a later stage, also take the form of
defined benefits. All defined  benefits  are covered  by appropriate  insurance  policies.
Ordinary  Retirement  Pensions. Ordinary  retirement  pensions  from AFJPs are financed  entirely
from the capital accumulated  in individual  capitalization  accounts. They are paid to affiliates  reaching
6  A system  of government  credit transfers is already  in effective  use in the Czech  Republic  and has
also been proposed for Australia  and Mexico. The current Australian  government  is, however, unlikely
to implement  the promise  of a co-contribution  that had been made by its predecessor.
12retirement age (65 years for men, 60 years for women)  and they complement  the PBU that all workers,
with the requisite contribution  records, receive  from the public tier of the integrated  pension system (and
the PC during the transition  period).
The level of the old age pension depends  on a number  of basic parameters,  such as the length of
active (contributing)  and passive (receiving)  lives, the rate of growth of earnings and the rate of return
on accumulated  balances,  the rate of inflation,  the extent of indexation,  and in particular  whether  pensions
are set in nominal  terms or are indexed  to prices or wages.
Life annuities  and scheduled  withdrawals. Retiring workers are allowed to purchase a life
annuity from a specialized  retirement insurance  company  (which  may or may not be related to the same
AFJP),  to make scheduled  monthly  withdrawals  from their accounts,  or to combine  scheduled  withdrawals
with the purchase of a deferred annuity.
Life annuities  will probably  take the form of joint and last survivor (JLS)  term certain  annuities.
These  provide pensions  first to retiring workers  and then to their surviving spouses and also promise  to
make  payments  for a minimum  number  of years so that if workers  and their spouses die early, their heirs
will receive  the promised  payments. Life annuities  transfer the longevity  risk (i.e. the risk of outliving
one's ovn savings)  to the retirement  insurance  company. The  retirement  insurance  company  also assumes
the investment  risk if either a nominal or an indexed  contract is used with a fixed and predetermined
monthly  payment in nominal or in real terms. Variable annuity  contracts, on the other hand, leave the
investment  risk with retired workers in return for benefiting  from higher returns.  Annuity  policies are
irrevocable  contracts and retired workers lose the right to transfer their account  to other companies.
Scheduled  withdrawals  are determined  each year on the basis of the remaining  life expectancy  of
the family groups of affiliates  and the rate of return of the pension fund.  They are paid on a monthly
basis like life annuities. Workers who opt initially  for scheduled  withdrawals  are able to convert  to a life
annuity at a later stage.
The law also allows for fractional  withdrawals  when the account balances provide a monthly
payment  that is less than half of the PBU.  In these cases, the monthly payment  is equal to 50% of the
PBU even though the account  balances  will be exhausted  in a shorter period than the life expectancy  of
the account holder.  AFJPs are not allowed  to levy commnission  fees on fractional  withdrawals.
Scheduled  withdrawals  have three advantages  over life annuities: in the event of early death,
remaining account balances are inherited by dependents; they allow participation in higher returns
achieved by pension fund investments;  and they continue to allow retired workers to transfer their
balances  to other  AFJPs. Another  potential  advantage  for low income  workers, who as a group may  tend
to have a shorter life expectancy,  is that they avoid the possible regressive  effect on benefit payments
from being  included  in the same  annuity  pool as high income  workers. For their part, life annuities  offer
retiring workers  longer-term  protection  against  inflation  and against  the risk of outliving  their own savings
(excessive  longevity),  but they may  be based on more  conservative  real rates  of return  and mortality  tables
and they may also suffer from higher commission  charges.  The likely use of term certain variable
annuities in the longer run will reduce the gap between  whole life annuities  and scheduled  withdrawals.
Lump Sums and Early  Retirement. Workers are able to withdraw  in a lump sum any balance
in excess of the necessary  capital  to pay a pension equal  to 70% of pensionable  salary. The pensionable
salary for the private tier is defined as the average of the monthly salary received  during the five years
13prior to retirement. Early retirement  is allowed  if the balances  accumulated  in an individual  capitalization
account are sufficient to pay a pension equal to 50% of the average salary over the last five years of
employment.
Disability and survivorship  pensions. Disability  pensions  are paid to active members  who are
disabled under  circumstances not covered by labor accident and worker compensation insurance.
Disability  is certified  by special medical  committees,  set up with the approval  of the supervisory  agency.
Disability  and survivorship  pensions  are financed  from the balance  of the individual  capitalization
account  of the disabled  or deceased  affiliate, but AFJPs are obligated  to make  up any difference  to reach
the required pension. AFJPs are required  to arrange  one group insurance  policy for all their affiliates  to
cover disability  and survivorship  pensions.
Disability  pensions  are defined  benefits  because  they are set equal  to 70% of the average  monthly
salary during the five years prior to disability, irrespective  of the career earnings and contributions  of
workers.  (A lower percentage  of 50% is paid to workers with irregular contribution  records).  This
approach may encourage older workers with accumulated  balances that cannot achieve such a high
replacement  ratio to fake  disability  or even  to "disable"  themselves  in order to receive  the higher benefit.
One way to weaken  such incentives  would be to link the disability  pension  from the AFJP system  to the
projected replacement ratio from the past record of contributions and investment  performance of a
worker's individual  account.
Disability  pensions were a contentious  issue when the law was enacted  because the role of the
state  was unclear. The  problem  was aggravated  by the high incidence  of disability  pensions  under the old
pension system, although the creation of medical committees  with clear guidelines and strict rules is
expected  to alleviate  this problem. Since then it has been agreed  that the state will be responsible  for a
fraction  of the disability  pension  depending  on the number  of past service  contributions  to the old system,
while AFJPs will be pay the fraction given by new service  contributions.
Survivorship  pensions are paid to the surviving  spouse and other dependents  of deceased active
or passive affiliates. In the case of death of already  retired workers, the pension  payable to the survivors
will depend on the terms of the purchased life annuity or on the remaining  balance in the individual
capitalization  account  if the deceased  worker  had chosen  the system  of scheduled  withdrawals. In the case
of death of an active  worker, the survivorship  pension  will be equal  to 70 % of the average  monthly  salary
during the five years prior to death.  The survivorship  pension will be reduced to 50% in the case of
surviving spouses with dependent  children with 20% for each dependent  child but subject to an overall
limit that survivorship  pensions cannot  exceed the original pension of the deceased  worker.
The cost of disability and term life insurance is likely to be higher in Argentina compared  to
Chile.  This will imply higher premiums.  This is because disability insurance must make up the
difference  between the accumulated  balance in the individual  capitalization  account and the technical
capital  needed  to buy a disability  pension  equal to 70% of the average  monthly  salary  of the last five  years
before disability. A system with a lower net contribution  rate will leave a bigger gap to be covered by
disability  insurance. As already  noted above,  in Argentina,  the net contribution  amounts  to 7.5 % against
10  % in Chile.
Because  of the very young age of the new capitalization  system,  very few benefits  are being paid
out. Out of nearly 5,000  beneficiaries  in June 1996,  4,400 were survivorship  pensioners  and another  400
14were disability  pensioners. Only 1  10 benefits  were for ordinary retirement. However, the public pillar
continued to pay various types of pension benefits to well over 3 million people.  The number of
beneficiaries  increased  to 9,200 in March 1997  with survivorship  pensioners  representing  7,700 or 84%
of the total.
Management  Companies  and Market  Concentration
Only specialized  pension fund management  companies  (known  as Administradoras  de Fondos de
Jubilaciones  y Pensiones  or AFJPs) are authorized  to participate  in the system. They must be set up as
joint-stock companies  and can be established  by any group of shareholders,  including  banks and other
financial  institutions,  large corporations,  trade associations,  labor  unions, and groups of workers. AFJPs
are regulated  and supervised  by a specially  created  agency, the Superintendencia  de AFJP or SAFJP.
Apart from AFJPs, life insurance  companies  also play a big part in the new pension system by
providing term life and disability insurance, while specialized retirement insurance companies are
exclusively authorized to provide retirement life annuities.  Insurance companies are regulated and
supervised by the insurance  supervisory  agency.
AFJPs are required to have a minimum  capital of 3 million pesos.  They are also required to
maintain  an investment  reserve  (encaje)  to meet any shortfalls  in profitability. This must be equal to the
larger of 3 million  pesos or 2 % of the total assets  of the pension  fund under management. Thus, to start
7 operations, an AFJP needs a capital of 6 million  pesos.
Each AFJP is allowed  to operate only one pension fund for all its affiliates. The pension fund
is an independent  entity and is fully segregated  both legally  and financially  from the AFJP.  The assets
of the pension fund belong exclusively  to the affiliates, are not attachable,  and are not affected  by any
financial  losses suffered by the AFJP. To protect the interests of their members, all transactions  of the
pension fund must be  carried out at officially recognized markets where they can be  effectively
supervised. Furthermore,  AFJPs are required  to establish  custody agreements  with authorized  custodial
institutions for the safekeeping  of the securities in which they invest.
T  he law requires  the state-owned  Banco  de la Nacion  to establish  an AFJP. It was stated in the
law that this AFJP should  provide  a guaranteed  minimum  rate of return  (expressed  in both dollar and peso
terms), should not levy any commission  fees, and should direct some of its pension fund assets into
specified investments.  However, some of these provisions have been eliminated or substantially
weakened. The Government  objected  strongly  to the  provision  of a dollar rate guarantee  and this has been
eliminated. The management  of Banco de la Nacion itself was against the no-charges  provision and
charges  are now levied.  The guarantee  in terms of a minimum  peso rate of return (equal  to the rate of
interesi on savings accounts)  has not been dropped yet but it is likely to be watered down significantly.
Some commentators  have observed  that it could be applied to the lifetime  performance  of an individual
capitalization  account, from its opening  up to the retirement  of its owner. If so, the minimum  peso rate
7  These initial capital requirements  are much higher than those imposed  in Chile.  Although this
might discourage  entry, the primary concern  of the Argentine  authorities  is to avoid a fragmentation  of
the market and to  help establish a robust and well regulated system.  Later on, the initial capital
requirements  could be lowered if the authorities  wish to increase the contestability  of the market and
strengthen the threat of potential competition  from new entrants.
15guarantee  would become fairly innocuous. The AFJP of the Banco  de la Nacion  does place a significant
proportion  of mobilized funds in regional projects (see below).
Since  the introduction  of the new system in April 1994, 26 AFJPs have  been authorized,  though
one has failed to start operations. The number  of AFJPs was reduced  to 22 by mergers  that took place
during 1995 and was reduced further to 20 in late 1996. Most of the active AFJPs are joint ventures
between  domestic  and foreign  banks and insurance  companies,  although  some have been  created  by trade
unions and other groups of shareholders. Domestic and foreign banks control 65% of the capital of
AFJPs, followed  by insurance  companies  that hold a further 15  %.  Because  of the larger size of  bank-
controlled  AFJPs, the share of banks  in total funds  under management  is even  greater at 73 % (Schulthess
and Demarco 1996:25-26). Of this, 36% is represented  by private domestic  banks, 12%  by state-owned
domestic  banks, and 25% by foreign  banks (Rofman  and Bertin 1996:34).
Prior to the launching  of the new pension system, prospective  AFJPs engaged in considerable
preparatory work, not only in developing  appropriate  computer  systems  but also in mounting extensive
marketing  and publicity  campaigns. Particularly  strong activity  was focused  on signing large employers
and attracting high income workers.
The vigorous  response  of the private sector  to the new pension  system  is underscored  by the total
spending in start-up costs.  These amounted  to an aggregate  sum of over 600 million pesos (Table 5).
The companies  will be allowed to amortize  their start-up costs over a ten-year period, up from a three-
year period that was initially provided. In addition to their start-up  costs, the AFJPs have collectively
mobilized  an additional  270 million  pesos  of which  over 190  million  pesos  is in the form of equity  capital.
This covers both their minimum  capital and investment  reserves (encaje).
Table 5
DEFERRED  COSTS
Deferred  Affiliates  Acquisition  Affiliates  Acquisition
Cost  July 1, 1994  Cost per Aff.  June 1995  Cost per Aff.
July 1994  June 1995
(mn pesos)  (OOOs)  (pesos)  (OOOs)  (pesos)
Maxima  88.0  251.3  350  511.8  172
Consolidar  76.2  278.3  274  558.4  136
Previnter  54.2  99.9  543  297.0  182
Origenes  51.9  119.2  435  407.4  127
Siembra  47.6  245.4  194  519.4  92*
Nacion  44.1  150.8  292  426.8  103
Activa  41.1  58.7  700  125.1  329
Dignitas  35.7  40.5  881  --  --
All Other  175.6  522.1  336  1174.9  149
Total  614.4  1766.2  348  4020.8  153
Source: SAFJP
16The most successful AFJPs are those set up by strong groups of private domestic  and foreign
banks.  Consolidar, the largest AFJP in terms  of both affiliates  and funds under management,  is a joint
venture of Banco  de Credito  Argentino,  Banco  de Galicia,  Banco  Frances  and Dresdner Bank. Maxima,
the second largest, is a joint venture of Banco Roberts, Banco Quilmes, La Buenos Aires Insurance
Company,  Deutsche  Bank and IFC.  Siembra  is a joint venture  of Citicorp  and Banco  Rio.  Nacion, the
AFJP subsidiary  of the state-owned  largest  commercial  bank, is not a joint venture,  although  considerable
technical assistance  and training have been provided  by Provida, the leading  Chilean AFP.  Origenes is
a joint venture of Banco  Provincia Buenos  Aires, Banco  Santander,  Provincia  Seguros  and Metropolitan
Life.  Finally, Previnter is a joint venture  of Banco  Boston, AIG and Banco del Sud.
Previnter and Activa (a joint venture, among  others, of Banco  Mariva, the ING Group, and the
Chilean AFP Habitat)  had a rather disappointing  start.  At one point, a merger between  these two firms
was discussed, but this did not materialize. Instead  the following  four mergers  have been completed  so
far.  Filrst,  the takeover of Dignitas  (a joint venture  of Cigna  Insurance  and Omega  Seguros)  by Siembra.
This was completed  in May 1995. Second, the triple merger of Activa with Anticipar (a joint venture
of the ABN-Amro  group and several local institutions)  and Savia  (a joint venture involving  Paribas and
Sudamerica  Compania  de Seguros). Third, the merger of Jacaranda, in which the Principal insurance
group from the US took a controlling  management  stake, with Ethika, which was already owned  by the
Principal group.  This merger was effected in late 1996. And, finally, the further merger of Activa-
Anticipar  with Origenes. This has created  the largest AFJP in terms of affiliates  and the third largest in
terms of funds. The  merger reflects the strong commitment  and expansion  strategy  of the Spanish  Banco
de Santander  group, which also controls one of the few successful  new AFPs in Chile.
The leading AFJPs are already quite large.  In March 1997, Consolidar has about 850,000
affiliates  and over one billion  pesos  under management.  Origenes  has over 900,000 affiliates  and manages
900 million  in assets. Nacion,  the sixth largest in terms  of affiliates  and funds,  has 460,000 accounts  and
400 million pesos under management. In Chile, Provida has 1.5 million affiliates  and the equivalent  of
over 5 billion US dollars  under management.  The leading  pension  fund management  companies  are likely
to become over time major financial  institutions. At the other end of the spectrum, 8 AFJPs have less
than 60,000 affiliates  each, while 7 AFJPs control less than 75 million pesos each.
Two of the AFJPs, Generar  and Futura, appear  to have  adopted  a clear strategy  of attracting  high
income  workers. The latter  has been established  by the  trade union representing  workers  in the electricity
and power sector. The average  balance  per affiliated  worker in June 1996  amounted  to over 2500 pesos
for Generar  and to 1800  pesos  for Futura. These compare  with an overall average  balance  of 730 pesos.
Among the largest six AFJPs, Consolidar, Siembra, Maxima and Previnter had average balances of
between 800 and 840 pesos, while  the average  balance  for Nacion  and Origenes  was around 600 pesos.
AFJPs differ significantly  in the extent to which their affiliates are active contributors.  For
instance, in the case of Futura, 70% of affiliates  were active  contributors  in May 1996. Unidos, another
AFJP set up by cooperatives  and trade unions, had a ratio of 69%, while Generar  reported a 63% ratio
of active contributors.  In contrast, Mas Vida and Jacaranda had active contributors that represented
respectively only 29% and 36% of their affiliates.  Among the six largest AFJPs, Consolidar and
Previnter had ratios around 54%, Maxima and Origenes around 51%, while Siembra had 48% and
Nacion  47%.
The relative  performance  of Nacion  has attracted  considerable  interest because  of the explicit  and
implicit  government  backing. As shown  in Table 6, Nacion  has consistently  lost market share, declining
17Table 6
MARKET CONCENTRATION OF AFJPs
(per cent of affiliates)
9/94  6/95  6/96  3/97
Origenes  7.9  10.1  10.8  16.5
Consolidar  14.3  13.9  14.2  15.4
Maxima  13.1  13.4  14.0  14.9
Siembra  11.9  12.9  12.9  13.1
Previnter  5.3  7.4  8.8  9.4
Nacion  11.9  10.6  9.1  8.3
All Other  35.6  31.7  30.2  22.4
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Top 3  39.3  40.2  41.1  46.8
Top 6  64.4  68.3  69.8  77.6
Herfindahl Index  856  903  948  1121
(per cent of funds)
9/94  6/95  6/96  3/97
Consolidar  16.3  15.7  16.2  16.9
Maxima  14.0  13.9  14.6  16.1
Origenes  5.4  7.6  9.3  14.4
Siembra  14.7  15.3  14.2  14.3
Previnter  7.2  8.4  9.9  10.2
Nacion  7.4  8.1  7.4  6.4
All Other  35.0  30.7  28.4  21.2
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Top 3  45.0  44.9  45.0  47.4
Top 6  65.0  69.3  71.6  78.8
Herfindahl  Index  919  949  998  1158
Source: SAFJP
18from inearly 12% of affiliates in September 1994 to 8% in March 1997.  Its share of funds under
management, which is much smaller than its share of affiliates because of the low average account
balance, has also gone down, although less sharply.
Concentration  in the market is quite high, though it is lower than in Chile. The largest 3 AFJPs
accounlted  in June 1996  for 41  % of all affiliates  and 45% of total funds (Table 6).  The top six had 70%
of affiliates  and controlled  72% of funds. At the other end of the scale, the ten smallest  AFJPs accounted
for less than 8% of the market.  But concentration  increased  significantly  as a result of the series of
mergers. The top three AFJPs now account for 47% of both affiliates  and funds, while  the Herfindahl
ratio rose to  1121 for affiliates and to  1158 for managed assets from well below 1000 prior to the
mergers. In Chile, the 3 largest companies  accounted  for 68  % of all affiliates  in 1994  (down  from 73 %
in 1981)  and for 54% of all funds (down  from 74% in 1981). The Herfindahl  index was 2200 for funds
under management  in 1981, although  it fell to 1260  by 1994.
Investment  Rules
The investments  of AFJPs are subject  to very clear rules in order to protect the interests  of their
affilialtes. The investment  rules are guided  by two basic operating  principles: safety and profitability.
To ensure safety, pension funds must be properly  diversified  and invested  in approved  assets, while to
achieve  profitability, pension funds must be allowed  to seek the highest returns under these rules.  In
compliance  with these principles, only maximum  limits are imposed  on investments.
Approved assets include securities that are traded on organized exchanges or issued by well
regulated  and supervised  entities,  such as banks. Both debt and equity  securities  of private issuers  require
proper risk rating from a rating agency. This requirement  impedes  investment  in foreign equities  that are
not rated and in mutual funds that hold any type of nonrated  instruments. Although  they aim to protect
pension funds from investments  in exotic risky securities, they also impede  international  diversification
(Ciampi 1997).
The law specifies maximum limits but authorizes the central bank, the CNV and the new
supervisory  agency  to issue regulations  that could  impose  lower limits. It also authorizes  the same  bodies
to issue regulations  placing limits on investments  in the securities  of individual  issuers.  Investments  in
privatized companies  are encouraged  but no attempt  is made to promote the dispersion of ownership  of
Argerntine  companies,  though the individual  company  limits may contain  provisions to that effect.
The investment  rules specify  limits for some subclasses  of instruments  (e.g. convertible  bonds or
securities  of privatized  companies)  but looking  at major classes of investments,  the rules contained  in the
law (the lower limits, if  any, imposed by subsequent regulations are shown in parentheses) limit
investments in federal securities to 50% (50%) of a fund's total assets, 30% (15%) in provincial and
municipal  securities, 30% (28%) in bank deposits, 40% (28%) in mortgage  bonds or mortgage-backed
securities, 40% (28%) in corporate  debt of various types, 50% (35%) in corporate equities,  20% (14%)
in shares of mutual funds, 10% in direct investment  funds, 10% (2%) in futures and options contracts,
and 10% in foreign securities (Table 7).
Pension funds are prohibited from investing in the shares of AFJPs, insurance and risk rating
companies. The prohibition  of investments  in AFJPs aims to avoid  undue concentration  in the industry,
while in the case of insurance companies, it aims to avoid potential conflicts of interest given the
contractual  and common  ownership  ties between insurance  companies  and AFJPs.  Moreover, because
19Table 7
INVESTMENT  LIMITS  PER INSTRUMENT
(% of value of fund)
Law  Reg
a.  Federal state securities  50%  50%
b.  Provincial and municipal  securities  30%  15%
Corporate debt (c+d+e+f)  40%  28%
c.  Long-term corporate  debt  40%  28%
d.  Short-term  corporate debt  20%  14%
e.  Convertible  corporate  bonds  40%  28%
f.  Convertible  bonds of privatized  companies  20%  14%
g.  Fixed term bank deposits  30%  28%
Argentine  equities (h+i)  50%  35%
h.  Equities of Argentine  companies  50%  35%
i.  Equities of privatized  companies  20%  14%
j . Shares of closed and open mutual funds  20%  14%
Foreign securities (k+l)  10%  10%
k.  Foreign government  bonds  10%  10%
1.  Foreign corporate bonds and equities  10%  7%
m.  Futures and options contracts  10%  2%
n.  Mortgage  bonds or mortgage-backed  securities  40%  28%
o.  Shares of direct investment  funds  10%  10%
p.  Regional  projects  30%  50%  m3x
*  Only applies to investments  of Nacion.
Source: SAFJP
20insurance companies  and AFJPs will engage in similar activities, such investments  would not provide
adequate  diversification  of risk.  Investments  in risk rating companies  are prohibited in order to avoid
potential conflicts  of interest. To avoid  self dealing  and misuse  of privileged  information,  AFJPs are also
not allowed  to invest in securities issued  by related companies.
The investment  limits are more liberal than those originally  applied in Chile, although  the more
detailed regulations  that have been issued since the passing of the law have imposed  a somewhat  more
restrictive  regime. In Chile, initial investment  rules imposed  a 100% limit for state securities, 80% for
mortgage bonds, 70% for bank liabilities, 60% for corporate bonds, and 20% for quotas of pension
funds 8. No investments  in corporate  equities  or foreign  securities  were allowed  in the initial  stages of the
Chilean scheme.
Nevertheless,  the investment  rules are still quite restrictive  and deviate  from practice in Anglo-
American  countries  where fund managers  are subject  to the prudent  man rule and are otherwise  free from
detailed  inivestment  guidelines. But in the context  of the experience  of developing  countries,  the absence
of strong and transparent  capital markets, the compulsory  nature of the pension  system, and the lack of
familiarity of pension members with capital market investments,  the detailed investment  rules appear
justified, provided they are revised in a flexible and timely manner to take account of the growing
maturity  of the system,  the greater  professionalism  of investment  managers,  and the modernization  of the
capital markets.
Asset Allocation
The investment  policies  of the AFJPs have generally  been quite conservative. In June 1995, the
main investments  included  government  bonds which accounted  for 46% of total funds and bank deposits
which repiresented  an additional  27%. Most  other  investments  were quite  low and well  within  their limits.
Particularly  low were  holdings of equities  (including  mutual  funds)  as well as investments  overseas  (Table
8).
Since  then, AFJPs increased  their holdings  of equities  which, together with mutual fund shares,
came to iepresent 15% of total assets in June 1996,  up from 6% in the first year.  The main reduction
occurred in holdings of bank deposits which fell from 27% of assets to 18%.  Foreign securities also
declined  from 3% to 0.5%. About 2% was invested  in cash, while  regional  projects  absorbed a declining
share and amounted  to 2.3% of funds in June 1996.
In March 1997, equity and mutual fund investments  rose to 23% of total funds.  Holdings of
government  bonds amounted  to 48%, bonds  of other  state bodies  to 4%, bank deposits  to 14%, corporate
bonds to 5%, and cash holdings to 3%.  Overseas  securities were a negligible  fraction of the total.
I  In Chile, the provision for investments  in the quotas or units of other pension funds aimed to
enable small AFPs to benefit from the professional  investment  management  skills of the larger AFPs.
It was meant to encourage  new entry into the AFP system  and stimulate  greater competition,  though no
AFP made use of this rule.  The provision is not included in the Argentine law where the required
minimum  capital and investment  reserve for new entry are much  higher than in Chile.
21In June 1995,  43 % of all investments  were in peso-denominated  and 57% in dollar-denominated,
mostly  locally  issued, instruments. A year later peso denominated  instruments  accounted  for 50% of total
assets, reflecting  to a large extent the growth of equity holdings.
In terms of the maturity  structure of debt instruments,  21  % were for less than two years, 40%
were for between two and four years, and 39% were for over four years.  The long-term bonds were
government  bonds that are carried at cost rather than market values. AFJPs are allowed  to hold up to
half their portfolio of government  bonds in issues that they are committed  to hold to redemption. These
bonds can  be reported  at acquisition  cost but with a gradual write-down  or write-up  of their value  to their
redemption  price as individual  issues approach  their maturity  date.
Investment  Returns
Pension  funds  are valued  daily at market prices  and AFJPs are subject  to minimum  relative  return
requirements  for the pension fund under their management. These are set in relation to the average
performance of all pension funds over any twelve-month  period and aim to protect affiliates from
excessive fluctuations  in returns and from wide dispersion  between different AFJPs.  The limits are
expressed in nominal terms, in contrast to Chile where they are set in real terms.  This may weaken
considerably  the protection  of affiliates  in case of high inflation,  since  the fluctuation  in real returns will
be much greater when inflation  is higher.
The minimum  requirement  stipulates  that if the investment  return is less than 70% of the average
of all pension funds, or if it is lower than the average  by 2 percentage  points (whichever  yields the lower
rate of return), the AFJP will be required  to make  up the difference,  first by transferring  funds from the
profitability  fluctuation  reserve (if such a reserve has been established)  and, if this is inadequate,  from
its investment  reserve. Similarly,  if the investment  return  is 30% higher than the average for all pension
funds, or exceeds  the average by 2 percentage  points (whichever  yields the higher rate of return), the
AFJP will be required  to place the difference  in a profitability  fluctuation  reserve. This reserve will not
belong to the AFJP, but will be an asset of the pension fund.  Failure to make up a shortfall in
profitability  will cause  the liquidation  of the AFJP concerned  and the transfer  of accounts  to other AFJPs.
The conservative  investment  approach  of AFJPs during the first months of operation of the new
system has been vindicated  by the financial crisis that was triggered by the large devaluation  of the
Mexican  peso in December  1994. Despite  fluctuations  during the year, the average  nominal  rate of return
for the industry as a whole amounted  to 13% in the first year of operation. With inflation running at
2.7%, this implied  a 10% real rate of return.  There was considerable  variation in the nominal returns
of individual  AFJPs.  The highest return amounted  to 20% and the lowest to 5.4% (Table 9).  The
fluctuation  reserve was activated  for one company  with returns in excess of the upper limit, while four
companies with returns below the lower limit were required to make up from their own encaje the
shortfall up to that level.
Investment  returns were much  higher  during the second  year of operation  as the economy  started
to recover and real interest rates declined. Declines  in interest rates give rise to substantial  capital  gains
in holdings of government  bonds  and this may  have contributed  to the higher returns in fiscal 1996. The
average  return amounted  to 23  %, while  no fund  was outside  the relative  profitability  norms. For the two
years combined,  the average  nominal  return reached 18  %, which  translates into a 15  % real return. This
impressive  performance  is of course explained  by the very high level of real interest rates in Argentina,




6/95  6/96  3/97
Government  bonds (at cost)  24.4  24.1  25.1
Government  bonds (market)  21.6  23.3  22.7
l'otal government  bonds  46.0  47.4  47.8
Other public bonds (at cost)  3.1  1.8  1.0
Other public bonds (market)  2.4  2.6  2.7
l'otal other public bonds  5.5  4.4  3.7
Long term corporate bonds  3.4  5.8  4.8
Short term corporate  bonds  3.4  4.9  2.0
l'otal corporate  bonds  6.8  10.7  6.8
Fixed term bank CDs  27.1  17.6  13.9
Elquities  privatized  companies  1.1  2.1  2.4
Other equities  0.9  11.4  17.6
Total equities  2.0  13.5  20.0
Closed mutual funds  0.1
Open mutual funds  4.2  1.4  2.7
Total mutual funds  4.2  1.5  2.7
Foreign gvt securities  1.4  0.2
Other foreign securities  1.5  0.3  0.5
Total foreign securities  2.9  0.5  0.5
Regional  projects (Nacion)  3.4  2.3  1.3
Cash  2.2  2.3  2.7
G3rand  total  100.0  100.0  100.0
Peso denominated  42.6  50.1  50.3
Foreign currency denominated  57.4  49.9  49.7
Source: SAFJP
23Table 9
INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE OF AFJPs, July 1994-June 1996
(Nominal annual rate of return on pension fuind assets)
First Year  Second Year  Whole Period
%  Rank  %  Rank  %  Rank
Prorenta  14.1  (5)  25.66  ( 1)  20.67  (  1)
Mas Vida  20.0  (1)  17.43  (22)  19.58  (2)
Origenes  13.8  (6)  23.55  ( 5)  19.46  ( 3)
Activa-Anticipar  15.6  (2)  20.89  (11)  19.09  ( 4)
Maxima  10.9  (14)  24.56  ( 3)  18.39  ( 5)
Jacaranda  14.8  (4)  20.30  (16)  18.35  ( 6)
Consolidar  10.3  (16)  23.65  (4)  18.17  ( 7)
Ethika  10.9  (13)  20.83  (12)  18.17  ( 8)
Fecunda  15.3  ( 3)  19.42  (19)  18.14  ( 9)
Previnter  11.6  (10)  22.81  (8)  17.85  (10)
Siembra  10.0  (17)  23.51  (6)  17.69  (11)
Unidos  8.7  (19)  25.66  (2)  17.69  (12)
Arauca  13.3  (7)  19.99  (17)  17.38  (13)
Claridad  12.8  ( 8)  20.46  (14)  17.36  (14)
Previsol  11.0  (12)  22.02  (9)  17.18  (15)
Generar  11.0  (11)  20.48  (13)  16.38  (16)
Nacion  12.1  ( 9)  19.22  (20)  16.31  (17)
Profesion  10.8  (15)  19.69  (18)  15.89  (18)
Futura  9.6  (18)  20.42  (15)  15.60  (19)
San Jose  5.4  (22)  22.93  (7)  14.46  (20)
Afianzar  5.7  (21)  21.43  (10)  13.92  (21)
Patrimonio  7.9  (20)  18.35  (21)  13.63  (22)
All AFJPs  13.0  22.83  17.74
Source:  SAFJP
24It jis  interesting  to note that, among  the large AFJPs, Maxima  and Consolidar  rank respectively
5th and 7th in terms of total return over the first two years, Previnter and Siembra  are in 10th and 11th
place, while Nacion  is 17th. Of the six largest, only Origenes  is among  the top three performers. Rather
surprisingly,  Generar  and Futura, the two funds  with highest  individual  account  balances, report  low total
returns, ranking respectively  in 16th and 19th  place.  In contrast, small and medium-sized  AFJPs, such
as Prorenta, Mas Vida, Activa-Anticipar  and Jacaranda, report high rates of return.
Operating  and Insurance  Costs
AFJPs charge  an average  of 3.5  % for operating  costs  and insurance  premiums. Commission  rates
were adjusted  slightly  during the first 24 months  of operation. In June 1996,  they ranged  from a variable
fee of 2.3%o  to 3.5% plus a fixed monthly  fee per collection  ranging from 0 pesos (7 companies)  to 5
pesos (2 companies)  and 8 pesos (1 company). Commission  fees are subject  to similar regulations  as in
Chile.  Nci  exit fees and asset management  fees are permitted. The companies  can charge a flat and a
variable  fee per collection  as well as an entry fee. They can also charge a fee per scheduled  withdrawal.
Unlike  in Chile, AFJPs are allowed  to offer loyalty  bonuses,  though their impact  in discouraging  transfers
seems to have been very limited.
The allocation  of commission  charges  between  insurance  premiums  and operating  costs  has varied
considerably  across companies  and over time within  each company. It appears  to be somewhat  arbitrary
and may aliso  be influenced  by tax considerations. In general, insurance  premiums  were set at relatively
high levels at the beginning of the period, but premiums were later adjusted downwards as the loss
experience  was better than expected. At the beginning,  companies  allocated  between 1.6% and 2.4% for
insurance  premiums  but the insurance  allocation  was much  lower in later months. The average  allocation
in the firsit  year amounted to 46% of commission  revenues  or 1.6% out of the total of 3.5%.  In the
second year, the average allocation  was reduced  to 26% of commission  revenues  or 0.91  % of covered
salary.  In the first 8 months of fiscal 1997 (i.e. up to and including February 1997), the insurance
allocation declined  further to 22% of revenues.
Tctal commission  fees charged  on affiliates  have not been reduced  but a greater proportion  has
been used to recover the high operating and start-up  costs.  This explains  the vast improvement  in the
operating results that AFJPs reported as a whole in fiscal 1996 (see below). Operating  costs (excluding
insurance  charges  and the amortization  of deferred  costs) amounted  to an incredible  74% of average  assets
under management  in fiscal 1995  but fell to 23  % in fiscal 1996 as a result of the rapid accumulation  of
assets.  Thley  declined  further to 10% of average assets during the first 8 months of fiscal 1997. These
proportions  are clearly very high by comparison  to the levels found  in countries  with mature pension  fund
systems  butt  they will decline  over time as assets continue  to accumulate. Operating  costs declined  as a
proportion  of contributions  from 27% in fiscal 1995  to 22% un fiscal 1996  and 21 % in fiscal 1997 (first
8 months). In Chile, the operating costs fell from 14% of assets in the second  year of operation of the
Chilean system  to less than 2% at present.
ThLe  25 AFJPs spent 600 million pesos before starting operations, another  500 million pesos in
the first year and an additional  600 million  pesos in this second  year, resulting in a total amount  of over
1.8 billion pesos.  Another 500 million pesos was spent during the first 8 months of fiscal 1997,
equivalent  to an annual amount  of 750 million  pesos. The total of 2.2 billion amounts  to about  0.8% of
GDP.
25About 55  % of operating  costs are absorbed  by salaries and other staff costs, 20  % by marketing
costs (other than salaries)  and another  20% by system  and other administration  costs.  Allowing for the
fact that over 60% of staff costs are incurred for staff engaging in selling and marketing, the total
marketing  costs account for over half of all operating  costs--a confirmation  of the marketing  challenge
facing AFJPs and of the marketing  intensity  of the new system. AFJPs did not charge  affiliates  fully for
all their operating costs.  In fiscal 1995, non-insurance  fees charged on affiliates  amounted  to 46% of
average funds.  This fell to 24% in fiscal 1996  and to 11% during the first 8 months of fiscal 1997..
The amount  of commission  fees  used to cover operating  costs rose from 1.9% to 2.5 % of covered
salary in the second  year and increased  further to 2.8% in fiscal 1997.  This represents  an increase from
25% to 33% to 37% of the new amounts  invested  in the fund. Despite  the achievement  of reasonable  real
rates of return by the pension  funds, individual  workers  with full  contribution  records since  the beginning
of the new system suffered highly negative  net real rates of return in their accounts in fiscal 1995 and
1996, although they will probably earn a positive net real return in fiscal 1997.  Over the long run,
operating  costs should  come down  to more reasonable  levels as assets continue  to accumulate  and annual
contributions  will represent  a declining  fraction  of total balances  in individual  accounts. On a cumulative,
lifetime  basis, workers  will likely  earn highly  positive  real rates  of return, unless gross investment  returns
decline  and remain at very low levels.
This is in line with the Chilean  experience  and reflects  the very high start-up  and initial  marketing
costs. The levying  of commission  fees on the flow of contributions  rather than on assets may exacerbate
this problem, though only if AFJPs would  have been  prepared to absorb a bigger part of operating costs
in the first few years of the scheme.  Otherwise, the level of asset fees could have been set at a
sufficiently  high level to achieve  the same amount of cost recovery.
The issue of whether  the high marketing  and operating costs of the new pension system are due
to its regulatory  framework,  in particular  the use of specialized  management  companies,  is a wider issue
that has been raised in the context of Chile and other Latin American countries  (Shah 1996). Although
it is argued that allowing  commercial  banks, insurance  companies  and mutual funds to manage  pension
accounts  might have resulted in lower costs, such an outcome  was unlikely  to occur because  of the weak
financial  position of most Argentine banks and insurance  companies  and the underdevelopment  of the
mutual fund sector.
Another  explanation  attributes  the high marketing  costs to the "one  price" rule, which  implies  the
imposition  of unduly high fees on high income  workers.  According  to this view, both the marketing
intensity  and the use of agents  to induce  workers to switch their accounts  are a means  of rebating  to high
income  workers  the excessive  amount  of fees (Valdes-Prieto  1994, Arrau et al 1993). Relaxing  the "one-
price" rule, allowing discounts for high balance  workers and for groups of workers, and introducing
subsidies  for low income workers could help mitigate this problem.  Another possibility is to impose
limits on commission  fees, marketing  campaigns  and the use of selling agents, although  this should be
considered  as a last resort measure, if every other solution  were to fail to contain operating costs.
Account  Switching
As in Chile, the right to change  management  company  is an essential  element  of the new system.
However, strong competition  among  AFJPs and aggressive  use of selling agents, combined  with lack of
familiarity  by workers as well  as absence  of a reliable  track record, have given  rise to numerous  transfers
of accounts  that are characterized  by an unclear pattern.  During the first six months of calendar 1995,
26142,000 accounts  were transferred  among  AFJPs. This corresponded  to about 7  % of active  accounts  or
14% on arn  annual  basis. Account  switching  increased  to 242,000 in the second semester  of 1995  and the
same level was also observed in the first half of calendar 1996. The increase  in the second semester  of
1995  was caused  in part by the decision  to allocate  on a proportional  basis the undecided  accounts. Thus,
the level observed  in the first half of 1996  effectively  represents  a continuing  upward trend in the number
of account:  transfers, although some of it may reflect the reaction of affiliates  to the allocation  decision
of the autLorities. For the whole of 1996, transfers  (including  the allocation  of undecided  ones) involved
484,000 accounts,  representing  nearly 20% of active  accounts. Although  still much  lower than in Chile,
this level of account  switching  is considered  too high and various measures  are being discussed  to try to
contain  over-frequent  account  transfers. The level  of account  transfers  appears  to have  continued  unabated
in fiscal 1997.
Anong AFJPs, the pattern of net gainers  and net losers has changed  over time (Table 10). Over
the whole period, the main gainer was Previnter with a net increase of 55,000 accounts followed  by
Origenes with 45,000.  However, in the first semester  of 1996, Maxima  was the net gainer in terms of
account transfers with a net inflow of 18,000 accounts,  followed  by Previnter  with 15,000. Most of the
other AFJPs had net gains or losses  within  plus or minus 7,000, except  for Nacion,  which suffered a net
loss of 19,000 affiliates. Nacion  suffered a cumulative  net loss from account  switching  of nearly  40,000
accounts.  Nevertheless,  because of the affiliation of new workers, the total number of its affiliates
increased  by nearly 500,000 during this period. Rather surprisingly, Siembra,  the AFJP subsidiary  of
Banco  Rio and Citibank, also suffered a net cumulative  loss of 20,000 accounts.
A study by SAFJP found that the main determinants  of net gains in account  switching  were the
number  of selling  agents  (promotores)  and the level of spending  on marketing  and selling. The investment
return appeared to play an important  role only in the first semester  of 1996, while the level of flat fees
seemed also to have an effect.  However,  the average level of commission  charges  played a minor role
as did the size of the AFJP (Grushka  and De Biase 1996).
Table 10
PATTERN  OF ACCOUNT  SWITCHING
(OOOs)
Six Months  Ending in
Jun 95  Dec 95  Jun 96
Inflows  Net  Inflows  Net  Inflows  Net
Consolidar  15.3  +  1.3  34.3  +  8.1  31.6  +  3.9
Maxima  10.3  - 18.8  32.3  +  0.4  43.3  +  18.3
Siembra  11.1  - 9.7  20.8  - 7.7  25.8  - 3.5
Origenes  24.5  + 19.2  36.3  +22.2  23.6  +  4.6
Nacion  9.5  - 7.8  14.6  - 10.7  11.3  - 18.7
Previnter  27.6  +18.6  40.6  +22.3  39.8  + 15.1
All Other  43.3  +  2.8  62.9  - 34.6  66.2  - 19.7
Total  141.9  0  241.8  0  241.6  0
Source: SAFJP
27The transfer of accounts is giving rise to disputes among AFJPs.  There are allegations of
manipulation  and exploitation  of unsophisticated  workers, even of forgeries and other types of fraud.
Some  companies  are in favor of using a carta documento  whereby  workers  will have  to visit a post office,
sign a declaration  that they want to transfer  their account  and send it to the companies  concerned  through
the post.  Under this system, the companies  would incur all the additional  costs involved. However,
companies  with low market shares, and especially  those with market shares that are below their targeted
levels, are opposed  to these  or any other  measures  that would  inhibit the right of workers  to transfer  their
accounts. Other commentators  have proposed  placing limits on the level and structure of commissions
paid to agents, while there are also some proposals  to require agents  who change AFJPs to refrain from
taking customer accounts with them.  It is claimed that one of the reasons for the high mobility of
accounts  in Chile is the high mobility  of selling agents.
The importance  of selling agents  is underscored  by the very large number  used during the sign-up
period between April and June 1994 when almost 50,000 agents  were used.  This number  was inflated
by the very large number of agents  hired by Banco de la Nacion  (17,000). The number of agents fell
substantially  after the completion  of the very intensive  initial campaigns. It fell to 17,400 in December
1994  and 11,800 in June 1995. The total number  grew subsequently  to 14,800  in June 1996 and 18,400
in December 1996.
Financial Results  of AFJPs
One of the most interesting  aspects  of the Argentine  pension reform was the vigorous response
of the private sector. This was exemplified  by the aggressive  spending  in start-up  costs, both for system
development  and marketing  campaigns.
The AFJPs suffered  a heavy  operating  loss in fiscal 1995  of no less than 180  million  pesos. This
was converted into an operating  profit of nearly 50 million pesos in fiscal 1996 (Table 11). This was a
major turnaround, that is mostly explained  by the lower cost of disability  and term life insurance, the
retention  of a higher  proportion of commission  revenues  for cost recovery, and by the continuing  rise in
affiliation and accumulated  balances, although several AFJPs also achieved some improvement in
productivity  and cost efficiency.
Financial  results are likely  to be much  improved  in fiscal 1997. 11 AFJPs  have already exceeded
their break-even  point and another 5 suffer a small operating deficit, with only 4 companies  continuing
to suffer  large operating  losses. However,  the companies  have still a long way to go to recoup  their very
high start-up costs.  The importance  of scale is underlined  by the fact that it is the largest AFJPs that
report a positive  operating  and overall financial  result. However,  the most successful  company  seems  to
be Generar, a smaller AFJP, which focuses  on high balance  workers.
Regulation  and Supervision
In a mandatory  retirement savings  scheme,  the state has a clear responsibility  to ensure that the
system  is safe and transparent  and is able to provide  adequate  long-term  benefits. For this reason, AFJPs
are subject to very detailed  rules and regulations  regarding  their investment  policies and their fiduciary
responsibilities  toward their affiliates.
28Table 11
FINANCLAL  RESULTS  OF AFJPS
(million  pesos)
First Year  Second Year  Third Year
(8 months)
Commissions  +587  +844  +680
Other revenues  +  6  +  16  +  18
Total operating  revenues  +593  +861  +798
Insurance  premiums  -272  -218  -149
Operating costs  -500  -596  -490
Total operating  costs  -772  -814  -639
Operating  result  -179  +47  +  59
Other costs (net) *  - 37  -62  - 38
Investment income (net) **  - 4  +  10  +  12
Net result  -220  - 5  + 33
Taxes and extraordinary  items  - 2  - 6  - 1
Net overall result  -222  -11  + 32
Non-Insurance Charges ***  315  626  531
Year-End  Assets (bn pesos)  1.36  3.84  6.05
Average Assets (bn pesos) ****  0.68  2.60  4.95
Insurance  premiums/commissions  46%  26%  22%
Operating costs/year  end assets  37%  16%  8%
Operating costs/average  assets  74%  23%  10%
Non-insurance  charges/average  assets  46%  24%  11%
Operating  Costs/Contribution  Revenues  27%  22%  21%
*  mainly covers amortization  of deferred  costs
**  net of monetary  correction
**4  non-insurance  charges  are given by total comnnission  fees less the amount allocated  for
insurance  premiums
**i *  average assets are the average of balances  at the beginning  and end of each year
Source: SAFJP
29AFJPs are subject to rigorous information  disclosure  requirements. They are required to report
daily to the supervisory agency their investment  transactions  and to submit monthly reports on their
financial  position and overall performance. They are also required  to provide  regular statements  (at least
three times a year) to their affiliates  disclosing  the last four monthly  contributions,  the commissions  and
premiums  deducted  from the account,  the financial  performance  of the pension fund and the accumulated
quotas and balance as well as the rate of return on their individual  account, and information  on the
average performance  and commissions  charged  by all AFJPs. AFJPs also have  to maintain  a list in their
offices containing  information  on the names  of directors and managers, their last balance  sheet, the size
of the fund under management,  the profitability  fluctuation  and investment  reserves, the price of each
quota, the structure and level of commissions  charged, and the composition  of its investment  portfolio.
The AFJPs are supervised  and controlled  by the Superintendency  of AFJPs (SAFJP). This is an
autonomous  agency  linked to the Ministry of Labor and Social  Security. The SAFJP is responsible  for
authorizing  and revoking  the license of AFJPs, for interpreting  the law and issuing detailed regulations
for the efficient  functioning  of the system, and for promoting  changes  in the law as necessary.
The SAFJP has a major responsibility  in supervising  the operations  and investments  of AFJPs.
It requires  the submission  of detailed  reports on investment  transactions  and the financial  position  of both
the pension fund and the AFJP, reviews the insurance  contracts  used by the AFJPs with regard to the
offer of disability and survivorship  pensions, and ensures that AFJPs credit contributions  received to
members' accounts and pay promptly the pension benefits due.  It also controls the operation of the
profitability  fluctuation  reserve funds and the investment  reserves of AFJPs.  It has the right to impose
fines and is empowered  to intervene  and supervise  the liquidation  of AFJPs that fail to maintain  adequate
investment  reserves or to comply  with regulations  for the custody of investment  documents.
During  the first year of operation  of the new system,  the authorities  appear  to have placed  primary
emphasis  on controlling  the credentials  and probity  of selling  agents. However,  there is already  growing
emphasis  on financial  and prudential  controls to ensure the safety of funds under management  and thus
protect the interests of affiliates.  A stricter approach is followed on the imposition of penalties for
violations of the regulations,  while use of the encaje  has been activated in the case of companies  with
insufficient  relative returns.  Some companies  emphasize  the importance  of a consistent and equitable
application  of the regulations  and sanctions  as otherwise  abiding  companies  may suffer by comparison  to
those who disregard the rules.
As in Chile, the state also guarantees  the minimum  profitability  of pension funds. If an AFJP is
unable to make up a shortfall in the rate of return from its profitability fluctuation and investment
reserves, it will be forced into liquidation. The state will then make up the shortfall in profitability  and
the balances of individual  capitalization  accounts will be transferred to other AFJPs.  The state also
guarantees  the annuity  payments  for old age pensions  as well as for disability  and survivorship  pensions
of failed insurance  companies,  subject to a maximum  limit of 5 times PBU.
30III.  OVERALL EVALUATION  AND CONCLUDING  REMARKS
The AFJP system  has been launched  successfully  and has benefitted  from a vigorous response  by
the private sector.  As the system is extensively  based on the Chilean prototype it shares many of its
strengths and weaknesses. But the two systems  are not identical  twins. There are many similarities  but
there are also some significant  differences.
Comnparison  with Chile
In both countries, only specialized  companies  are authorized  to manage  pension accounts,  there
is the "one account per worker, one fund per company"  limitation,  workers have the right to change
managemernt  companies,  companies  are required to treat all their affiliates  equally (this implies uniform
charging  schedules  and one group policy for term life and disability  insurance). Although  the Argentine
AFJPs are allowed to offer loyalty discounts, they are prevented from offering  group discounts or to
charge lower fees to high balance  workers. Companies  are free to fix the level of their charges  but their
investments are subject to regulations and tight supervision to ensure diversification  and safety, but
without direction  of investments. Also, the retirement  benefits of the private tier are broadly similar.
Pernsion  funds in both companies  achieved  remarkable  investment  returns, benefitting  from high
real rates of interest and generally  rising stock markets. But their operating  costs have been very high
in both coumtries,  probably reflecting very high start-up and marketing costs.  Both systems have
exhibited, indeed have suffered, from intense  and expensive  marketing  campaigns. This has given rise
to unexpectedly  high levels of account switching.
The excessive  level of costs implied  weak initial financial  results for the management  companies
and negative  net real rates of return for affiliates. In the long run, however, net real rates of return to
affiliates are expected  to be highly positive in both countries, while successful  management  companies
may attain high levels of profitability and returns to equity.
Bolh countries suffer from high, though tolerable, levels of market concentration  and from
uniform investment portfolios.  Both features have been attributed to the impact of the draconian
regulations  that have been applied  with regard  to the structure  of the industry and its investment  policies.
The differences  come in five main areas. First, in Chile only workers in dependent  employment
are mandated  to participate  in the system and new workers have no choice to join an unfunded  public
pillar.  In contrast, in Argentina,  the mandate  also applies  to self-employed  workers, while  new workers
continue  to have the right to join the unfunded  PAP system.
Second, in terms of long-term  savings  mobilization,  the Chilean scheme  uses 10% for long-term
capital  accumulation  against  only about  7.5% in Argentina. Thus, the relative  role of the private pension
funds in the capital  market will be significantly  greater in Chile.
Third, the cost of term life and disability  insurance is likely to be higher in Argentina, again
because a smaller amount is used for long-term  capital accumulation. Insurance  companies  will have to
make up a bigger  shortfall between  the accumulated  balance  and the required  capital for purchasing  the
survivorship or disability  annuity.
31Fourth, in Argentina,  the minimum  relative  profitability  returns are expressed in nominal terms,
in Chile in real terms.  Perhaps for this reason, in Argentina  the margin is set at 30% higher or lower
than the average return, whereas in Chile it is set at 50%.  However, using nominal returns provides
weaker protection  to workers in times of high inflation.
Fifth, investment rules are more liberal in Argentina, where from the start higher limits for
investments  in equities  have been allowed  as well as some investments  in foreign securities. In practice,
however, these have been of little relevance as the AFJPs have followed  very conservative  investment
policies and have stayed well within the permitted  limits.  In the longer run, however, a more liberal
approach  would  be appropriate. The Chilean system  has already benefitted  from considerable  relaxation
of investment  rules, although a further and faster relaxation  is advisable.
Despite  the differences  in the rate of long-term  capital  accumulation,  both systems  are contributing
to the accumulation  of long-term  financial  resources  and are having  a major impact on the development
and modernization  of the capital market.
They are also stimulating  the development  of the insurance  industry.  A significant  volume of
premiums is paid over to insurance  companies  to cover term life and disability  insurance  as well as for
the purchase  of annuities. The  insurance  industry  is adopting  more  modem  techniques  for assessing  losses
and handling  claims as well as for setting  and investing  reserves  and is linking  up with foreign companies
(including  reinsurance  companies)  that facilitate  the transfer of the required technology.
Policy Issues
The biggest and thorniest policy issue is the excessive  level of costs, the marketing  intensity of
the system, and the high level of account  switching. A detailed  study  of the reasons  behind  these features,
of their implications for the future evolution of the system, and of possible solutions needs to be
undertaken  in cooperation  with market practitioners. The main question  to be addressed is whether  the
apparently  "excessive"  costs  are motivated  by distorted  incentives  arising  from the "draconian"  regulatory
regime or whether the high costs are due to the massive acquisition  effort in attracting and opening
accounts  for 6 million  accounts  (and maintaining  active  accounts  for nearly  3 million  of them)  in a country
where holding of mutual fund accounts  was virtually non-existent  before the pension reform and where
even bank account holding among  the lower income groups  was not that prevalent.
The study should also examine  in detail the impact  of the various "draconian"  regulations that
have been applied so far, such as the "one account  per worker, one fund per company" rule, the no
discrimination  rule, the detailed investment  rules, the minimum  profitability  requirement,  and even the
reliance  on specialized  management  companies. The study could  also examine  the case  for restricting  the
frequency  of account  switching,  for putting  limits on the remuneration  of selling  agents, and perhaps also
for putting limits on commission  charges  levied on affiliates.
The study could further consider  the case for relaxing some of the more "draconian" of these
rules, although  in revising different rules, the first priority should  be to ensure that the system remains
safe, simple  and transparent. Needless  to add, the authorities  should continue  to engage in an informed
and fruitful dialogue  with market practitioners  to ensure that regulations  and supervision  remain market-
friendly and that changes in rules are adopted in order to streamline  the operation of the system and
enhance its attractiveness  to workers.
32Aniother  challenge  of major importance  is to increase  coverage  of the AFJP system. A campaign
for this purpose should be coordinated  with a campaign  to reduce evasion  from the public pillar.  Tax
incentives  could play an important  part in making participation in the AFJP system more attractive,
although  their implications  for the budget would also have to be assessed.
Finally, the Association  of AFJPs could  be encouraged  to mount  a collective  publicity campaign
to extol the benefits of the AFJP system and its complementarity  with the PBU from the public pillar.
Such a campaign  could pave the way for fundamental  changes in the role and structure of the PAP
component  of the second pillar.  A collective  campaign  may be advisable, given that the advertising
campaigns of individual  AFJPs tend to emphasize  reasons for joining one or the other company  but
without  unkderscoring  the benefits of the private tier 9.
I  Individual AFJPs go to remarkable  lengths  to highlight  their record of achievement  compared  to
other companies.  Thus, in the first year of operation when there were no records of investment
performance  or service standards,  some AFJPs have  drawn attention  to the number  of affiliates  per dollar
of acquisiltion  cost, per inch  of newspaper  advertising  space, and per second of television  advertising, as
measures of their higher efficiency  and thus reasons for joining them rather than their competitors.
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